Research Paper Example on Disinformation in the US

Abstract

The failure of a nation to deter another nations’ intelligence efforts allows it to be more susceptible to those efforts and become more divided, so why then has it taken so long for the United States to do something about Russia’s propaganda and disinformation campaign that has been occurring since the Cold War? The 2016 U.S. Presidential Election brought to the forefront the fact that cyberspace was a realm not taken seriously enough, so plans were made as to how to retain our position in cyber. This research attempts to view how effective those implementations have been by comparing hearings related to, and the environment surrounding, both the 2016 and 2020 elections. What gaps have been filled in cyberspace since 2016 and where do gaps remain?  

CAN HARDENED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRING AMERICANS BACK TOGETHER?

Stuxnet is a computer worm and the first deployed cyberweapon that was designed to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities (“Stuxnet NJCCIC Threat Profile.” 2017). The worm can be introduced via USB and hides all its files using a rootkit, which is a collection of software that gives an attacker administrative control of the device and makes the device’s reports on the validity of itself untrustworthy. Stuxnet spread itself, found software controlling how fast the centrifuges on Iran’s network of weapons spun, and altered that spin speed in a nearly undetectable way. This resulted in the loss of about 1,000 centrifuges and a major setback in Iran’s nuclear program. Iran has extensively revamped their approach to cyber security and counterintelligence (CI) since then; the United States should continue to strive for the same cyberspace relevancy to remain out of arms reach to somethings like this cyberweapon being inflicted on both its military and public infrastructure (Wege 2019).

As the method of intelligence collection has shifted from humans and hard copies to soft copies and signals intelligence (SIGINT), the methods of attacks and exploitation have shifted with it. The strength of the United States’ cyber counterintelligence (CCI) is being tested through the advanced, low-cost/high-reward techniques of cyber-attacks being carried out by Iran, China, Russia, North Korea, and numerous terrorist groups. This has led to a need to define exactly how we define laws dealing with cyberspace and how we respond to actors that break said laws (Ohlin 2017).

EO 12333 (1981) defines counterintelligence as “information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities...” The ‘other intelligence activities’ referred to in this research include disinformation and social media influence. Disinformation is information that is intentionally meant to mislead someone, which is usually used to the benefit of the entity providing the disinformation (Fallis 2015). Misinformation is similar in that it is misleading information but does not aim to mislead intentionally. Social media influence may include disinformation or misinformation and is conducted using various tactics, typically through social media websites. 

How has the disinformation presented to Americans been opposed to bridge the widening gap between groups of the nation in the last few years? A good way to see how far the U.S. may have come in implementing fixes to this problem is to compare the 2016 election to the 2020 election. This research will investigate the possible explanations as to why America has failed or succeeded in effectively combatting disinformation in recent years and what could be done differently to improve this in the future. This is an important topic not only because cyber-related threats are viewed by the Director of National Intelligence as a top threat to the interests and security of the U.S., but because a nation divided is hardly a nation at all (“Cyber Tops List of Threats to U.S., Director of National Intelligence” 2018). The hypothesis as to the results of this research is that the U.S., while legitimately attempting to implement strategies to achieve the goal of assisting cyber security and CCI, has lagged in adjusting its cyber structure to keep up with these goals.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

While reports are often made about disinformation, propaganda, social media influence, and outright cyber-attacks affecting the U.S., there has been significantly less literature published establishing a plan of action for these instances. The most concrete form of a plan of action in the literature is the National Cyber Strategy released from The White House in 2018, which discusses how the U.S. plans to protect its homeland’s cyber networks, maintain peace through punishing malevolent actors, and expand its own influence in cyberspace. 

Boussios (2021) points out an important shift in cybersecurity during the Trump administration that may contribute to the differing approach to how the U.S. deals with cyber influence and cyber warfare. The shift moves from a safer, defensive approach to more of an offensive approach, showing the world the U.S. will not be bullied in the realm of cyberspace. The transition referred to by Boussios is not at all emphasized in the National Cyber Strategy, which identifies how the Trump administration planned on dealing with cyberspace in the future. This includes the priorities of the administration, which were to further centralize management, readjust all information technology infrastructure to emphasize risk management, further contractor support and relations, and briefly looks far into the future to discuss quantum computing in relation to cryptography (The White House 2018). 

As far as the centralization and structural concerns, Lindsay (2021) lays out some issues with where Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) falls in the IC. Even though CYBERCOM is not a new command, it continues to struggle with relationships and belonging in the IC since it technically does not fall into the SIGINT/NSA realm, but would potentially benefit from doing so. While the National Cyber Strategy addresses centralizing cybersecurity, few things have been done in regard to liaising with or realigning CYBERCOM to remove the stovepipe that exists in that realm. 

Bill Priestap, the Assistant Director of the Counterintelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 2017, mentions the need to educate the public on how the technology involved in the electoral system works (“Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections” 2017). This issue draws another connection to the issue with over-classification of materials. If people do not know how the system works, when an Internet troll posts somewhere that the election results are rigged, people may tend to believe them simply out of lack of knowledge as to the process. Similarly, someone can post disinformation that some people will believe due to lack of legitimate information resulting in a divide of people in America, which starts to lead to distrust in the government and their systems (Zhao 2020).

Methodology

The two primary research methods used in this study are literature review and case studies. Case studies of the United States 2016 and 2020 elections will be presented to attempt to view the gaps successfully filled, as well as where some remain, in countering disinformation and cyber warfare during that four-year time frame. While this is a comparison of the same type of event, and while there will always be factors that heavily affect one election over another, it is key to note the presence of the COVID-19 pandemic, which took off in the U.S. early 2020, may have skewed things like how much time Americans are spending on social media and increased stressors related to lack of employment due to the pandemic affecting how people interact on social media. The largest constraint involved in this research method is external factors not related to the research question, mostly due to the pandemic. The 2020 election occurred during an odd time as far as how humans were forced to interact at the time (via social media instead of in person). 

Conclusion

There have been a few documents released hoping to improve the election after the seriousness of the influence of Russia in the U.S. presidential election came to light in 2016. Because the National Cyber Strategy seems to address so many problems facing the IC, it will be interesting to see how its creation has influenced implementation of the processes and structural changes required to make its goal a possibility. Although it goes without saying that there will be vulnerabilities in the United States’ approach to cyberspace, the result of this research will identify some of those vulnerabilities and suggest patches in response. Cyberspace is a new and ever-evolving field that cannot be put on hold until another nation decides to employ a cyberweapon like Stuxnet on our systems.