Essay Sample on Operation Anaconda: Principles of Mission Command in the Shahikot Valley

What principles of Mission Command (MC) were applied during Operation Anaconda (OA) that eventually led coalition forces to overcome nearly every challenge they faced? By utilizing overwhelming close air support (CAS) they turned the battle in their favor and as a result enemy fighters were either destroyed or fled the area, resulting in operational success. 

It's just before dawn in the snowcapped mountains of eastern Afghanistan and you're in a position to assault an enemy al-Qaida and Taliban stronghold. This raid you are about to conduct into the Shahikot Valley has been dubbed OA. You hear a C-130 gunship in the distance unleash a barrage of munitions that echoes throughout the valley below. Reports come over the radio that friendly forces are hit and there are multiple casualties. As a commander, you have to make a split-second decision to keep the mission moving forward. Utilizing the principles of MC you react and develop a hasty contingency plan. Throughout OA leaders at all levels utilized the seven principles of MC to achieve what would later be described as "absolute and unqualified success" by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Tommy Franks (Kugler, 2007, p. 1). The seven principles of MC include Competence, Mutual Trust, Shared Understanding, Commanders Intent, Mission Orders, Disciplined Initiative, and Risk Acceptance (HQ Dept of the Army, 2019). We will start by discussing competence and its role in OA.  

The U.S. ground forces from the 10th Mountain Division and 101st Airborne Rakkasans were already well trained and possessed unrivaled competence when they landed in Afghanistan. When mission planning started for OA, leaders realized the participation of Afghan fighters would be crucial in completing the mission at hand. Nearly 400 Afghan friendly forces were sourced for the mission, but they lacked the critical formal training required for this type of combat operation (Kugler, 2007). Special Operation Forces (SOF) would normally require several months to train local national forces but were given little more than a month (Kugler, 2007). At the end of this training, SOF advisors felt the Afghan forces displayed the competence needed to participate in OA (Kugler, 2007). In the next portion of this paper, coalition forces would learn just how valuable the MC principle of mutual trust was.

When looking at the principles of MC, mutual trust is considered to be "shared confidence between commanders, subordinates, and partners that they can be relied on and are competent in performing their assigned tasks" (HQ Dept of the Army, 2019, p. 19). During the initial stages of OA, there was a major lack of mutual trust between U.S. coalition Soldiers and members of the Afghan fighting force. While moving into the Shahikot Valley Afghan forces encountered enemy resistance and immediately suffered multiple casualties (Kugler, 2007). As a result, the Afghans halted their movement forward and would eventually retreat to their home base of Gardez (Kugler, 2007). This action would leave U.S. ground troops vulnerable and undermanned in the battle to come. This entire situation demonstrated how fundamentally important mutual trust is. If the mutual trust had been stronger, the Afghan fighters might have felt compelled to push forward into the battlespace. Afghan Forces would eventually rejoin the fight and play a major role in overall mission success (Kugler, 2007). During the brief Afghan retreat, it was critical that forces had a strong shared understanding and quickly realized the need for an increase in CAS. We will now go over this shared understanding more in-depth. 

Leaders need to have a shared understanding of the overall common operating picture (COP), especially on the battlefield. This can be difficult when dealing with joint force operations involving more than one MC. When the ground troops encountered multiple setbacks during the operation, U.S. air forces quickly realized the need for more CAS (Kugler, 2007). Originally mission planners did not anticipate this increased need for CAS, but due to a strong shared understanding of the battlespace forces quickly adapted to changing conditions (Kugler, 2007). The CAS given by U.S. air forces is considered to be one of the major factors that led to the OA victory. A clear commander's intent between all levels of leadership was clearly in place before the start of the operation. The next principal of MC that we’ll cover is commander’s intent. 

When applying the principles of MC the commander's intent "describes the broader purpose of the unit's operation in relationship to the higher commands intent and concept of operations" (HQ Dept of the Army, 2019, p. 22). The intent of OA was for coalition forces to surround the Shahikot Valley and squeeze the enemy into surrendering (Ellmer, 2021). Having a clear understanding of the commander's intent during OA was crucial as events did not unfold as originally planned. When plans failed and coalition forces had to deviate from the original plan, a clear commander's intent helped forces make tactically sound decisions. A clear commander's intent helped when developing another aspect of MC; creating a mission order. The concept of creating a mission order will now be discussed.  

When General Hagenbeck published the formal Operations Order, it laid the framework for what would become known as Operation Anaconda (Kugler, 2007). It was decided that coalition forces would utilize a strategy known as "Hammer and Anvil" (Kugler, 2007). The mission order called for the "hammer" task force to move across the Shahikot Valley and drive enemy fighters towards the "anvil" task force (Kugler, 2007). The anvil would hold a blocking position and deny the enemy fighters a chance to escape (Kugler, 2007). Although OA mission orders were well constructed, deviations from the plan would force leaders to utilize another principle of MC known as disciplined initiative. This disciplined initiative would play a critical role in one of the most well-known failures throughout the operation.

The principle of MC known as disciplined initiative was exercised throughout OA. One example of this was displayed during "The Battle of Takur Ghar". During this battle, an MH-47 Chinook helicopter was in the process of dropping several Navy Seals on top of Takur Ghar, when it started receiving heavy enemy fire and attempted to fly out of the area (Kugler, 2007). In the confusion Petty Officer First Class (PO1) Neil C. Roberts was near the exit ramp and slipped, falling about ten feet off the back to the ground (Ellmer, 2021). Disciplined initiative was taken when forces made the time-sensitive decision to mount a rescue mission and go back for PO1 Neil Roberts (Ellmer, 2021). All those aboard the Chinooks that evening inherently knew the last principle of MC, which is risk acceptance. Risk acceptance will now be discussed in more detail.

ADP 6-0 states "the greatest opportunity may come from the course of action with the most risk" (HQ Dept of the Army, 2019). Risk acceptance was considered when leaders decided to land forces directly on the summit of Takur Ghar (Kugler, 2007). An earlier plan to land 6,000 feet below this area and have teams hike to the top of the mountain was called off due to major airstrikes in the area (Ellmer, 2021). Positioning troops on top of Takur Ghar has been deemed a critical task due to the tactical advantage it had over the battlespace. Unfortunately, this risk acceptance ended up costing a major loss of human life for coalition forces. This next portion leads us to our conclusion. 

In conclusion by successfully utilizing the principles of MC, allied forces were able to eradicate enemy fighters from the Shahikot Valley. While utilizing the principles of MC added to the force’s ability to defeat the enemy, the CAS ultimately would prove vital to quickly gain the upper hand for friendly forces. Surely lessons learned during this battle would shape future military doctrine for years to come. 

References 

Ellmer, M. (2021, December 20). Operation anaconda: Into the Afghan Mountains. Grey Dynamics. Retrieved February 6, 2022, from https://www.greydynamics.com/operation-anaconda/ 

Headquarters Department of the Army. (2019, July 31). ADP 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. Army Publishing Directorate. Retrieved February 6, 2022, from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN18314-ADP_6-0-000-WEB-3.pdf   

Kugler, R. L., & National Defense University Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy. (2007, January 1). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A case study of adaptation in battle. Defense Technical Information Center. Retrieved February 6, 2022, from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA463075